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ECONOMIC GROWTH AND DEFENSE SPENDING:




Inthe lastdecadeincreasing attentionhasbeenfocusedonthe role
of militaryexpenditures indevelopingcountries.Onereasonforthisisthat
worldmilitaryexpenditures in1987 exceededonetrillionUSdollarsforthe
veryfirsttime;developing countries accounted forapproximately 17percent
ofthistotal.Despite thesteadygrowthindefensespending, scholars, forthe
most part, know littleaboutthe effectsof militaryspendingonthe local
economy.As SaadatDeger(1986: 3) recentlynoted:"The numbersare
mind-boggling;...Butwhatisclearisthatitisessential tostudy,analytically,
theeconomic dimensions ofmilitaryexpenditure inlessdeveloped countries
(LDCs) and carefullyevaluatethe costsand benefitsinvolved.... the
economics ofmilitarization arecrucial."
Anotherreasonforthe increased awarenessof militaryexpenditures
isthatdeveloping countries havehadtorecently scrutinize thesizeofoverall
budgets,especiallythe defensecomponent.In manycasesthe resource
basehasdeclinedbutthe needsfromothersectorsofthe economyhave
concomitantlyincreased.In manyinstances,defenseexpenditureshave
replaced highpriority development projects with littleknowledgeonthepart
of governmentsasto the impactofsuchadecision.
Muchofthecurrentresearchinthefieldofdefenseeconomics canbe
attributedto the earlyworkof EmileBenoit(1978) who concludedthat,
contrarytopopular opinion,developing countries whichhadhigherdefense
burdens(defensespendingas a percentageof Gross NationalProduct
(GNP)) usuallyhad higherrates of economicgrowth. This result was
diametricallyoppositetothe usually-held beliefthatincreasesindefense
spending meantlowergrowth;scarceresources weresiphoned awayfrom
moreproductiyeuseselsewhereinthe economy.
*An eadierversion ofthis paper was presented in 1989 at the Institute for Strategic and
InternaldonalStudies, Kuala Lumpur.Iwish to thanktwo anonymous referees formaking valuable
sugge_tJor_.
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In the last decade, other aspects of defense spending in developing
countries have received closer attention. Some of these areas are:
- howmilitaryspendingaffectsratesofsavingsandinvestment, and
consequently prospects for future growth;
- the economic and noneconomic determinants of defense spending;
- the determinants ofarms industries;
- the production of major weapons systems by onlycertain develop-
ingcountries;
- the discernibleeffects (botheconomic and noneconomic) of civilian
versus military regimes; and
- human capital formation and development inthe military. 1
In a recent paper, Looney and Frederiksen (1990) examined the
determinants of defense spending in six Asian countries: the Philippines,
Indonesia, South Korea, Malaysia, Thailand, and Singapore. Their research
suggested that economic variables and resource availability were the main
determinants of military expenditures inthese six countries. The purpose of
this paperisto test, for the same set ofcountries, the widely-held hypothesis
that the direction of causality is from military expenditures to economic
growth, i.e., that defense spending can infact "cause" economic growth.
The alternative hypotheses arethat (a) economic growth precedes defense
spending, thereby allowing countries to increase defense outlays; (b) no
relationship exists; or (c) afeedback loop exists whereby defense leads to
growth which, inturn, leads to more defense, etc. The working hypothesis
for this paper isthat, aprior/, one cannot specify the direction of causality
for any individual country. In addition to testing the usually assumed
hypothesis of defense to growth, this paper goes on to (a) extend the
preliminary resultsobtained by Frederiksenand LaCivita (1987) on causality
inthe Philippines which originally appeared in this Journal; (b)extend the
results obtained inLaCivita and Frederiksen (1991 ) from 1982 to 1988 for
the Philippines and Thailand; and (c) include comparative research results
for Indonesia, 2Malaysia, Singapore, and South Korea.
THE CAUSALITY ISSUE
Most studies to date have assumed that defense spending is an
exogenous variable and, thus, "causes" economic growth. Inother words,
the models which have been tested have specified economic growth as the
1. For an excellent review see Deger (1986) and Lindgren (1988).
2. The resultsfor Indonesia converting the period 1864-85 ere reported in Frederiksen
(1989). The results for Indonesia inthis paper cover the period 1961-88.FREDERIKSEN:GROWTH AND DEFENSESPENDING 133
dependent variable. Governments undertake military expenditure pro-
grams; and, presumablyat some (unspecified)time in the future, the
economywouldeitherbenefitorsufferasaresultofthisspending.Mostof
the studies inthe1980s focusedonwhethertheeffectwas positive,neutral,
ornegative (seeDeger1986). Thewidely-held beliefregarding theexogeneity
of defense spendingoriginatedwith Benoit. In his seminalpaper, he
recognizedthatthe directionofcausalitycouldbeeitherfromdefenseto
growthorfrom growthtodefense.As Benoitnoted:
Aquestion arose,however, about thedirection ofthisinteraction. Mightnot
the correlation be explained bythe influence ofgrowth ratesondefense
expenditures rather thanviceversa? Countries withrapidgrowth might feel
better ableto indulgethemselves in the luxuryof elaboratedefense
programs .... Theseplausible hypotheses didnotappear tobesupported by
theevidence .... Thusgrowth appeared toexertonlyaweakinfluence on
defense burdens. (Benoit1978:275-76)
Theassumedexogeneityofdefensehasrecentlybeenchallengedby
Joerding(1986) who examineddatafor57 countriesandconcludedthat
defenseexpenditures werenotstrongly exogenous. Whetherornotdefense
spendingpromoteseconomicgrowth is importantfor those developing
countries searching forwaystoimproveeconomicperformance-oratleast
tospendsoasnotto retardeconomicgrowth.Joerding'sworkis undoubt-
edlyan importantcontributiontothe literature.Butaswas pointedoutin
Frederiksen andLaCivita(1987)andLaCivitaandFrederiksen (1991 ),there
are two major criticismsof Joerding's work. First, Joerdinglumps all
countriesintoonesample.Thissuggeststhatifacausalrelationship exists
itiscommonto allcountries.Itisquitelikelythatinsomecountriesdefense
causes growth, in others growth causesdefense, and yet in others a




the structureof the economy,thetypeofdefensespending,andthe like.
InFrederiksenandLaCivita'sstudy(1987) ofthe Philippinesduring
1956 and1982theyusedJoerding'sprocedure (explained morefullybelow)





four years)were chosenarbitrarily,onecannotsay which isthe correct
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DATA SOURCES
The primary data sourceSon Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and on
the rateof growth of realGDP (except for Malaysia between 1961 and 1970)
was the International Monetary Fund's (IMF) internationalFinancialStatis-
tics Yearbook, The Yearbook: 1984 was used for data up to 1959, the
Yearbook: 1990fordata between 1960 and 1980, and the Yearbook: 1991
for the period 1981-88. Defense expenditures were drawn from the United
Nation's Statistical Yearbook (annual issuesthrough to 1983/84). The rate
of growth of real GDP was not reported by the IMF for Malaysia between
1961 and 1970. A series was constructed using the nominal GDPadjusted
for inflation/deflation by the Consumer Price Index (CPI). The defense
burden through to 1983 (for allcountries except Singapore and Indonesia)
was calculated as the percentage of GDP allocated to defense expendi-
tures. The defense burden data for the remaining years (1984-88) were
reported by the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
(ACDA) in World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers (annualissues).
A comparison of several overlapping years (Appendix A) indicated similar
ratios for the military burden whatever the source used.4Defense expendi-
tures for Malaysia between 1969 and 1985 were taken from the Institute of
Southeast Asian Studies' Defense Spending in Southeast Asia, (1987). The
defense burden for Singapore was derived exclusively from ACDA data.
The defense burden for Indonesia for the period 1961-66 was reported by
the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute's (SIPRI), S/PRI
Yearbooks on Wor/d Armaments and Disarmament. The remaining years
were drawn from USACDA.
The following sections describe, respectively, the methodology by
which the optimal lag length and correct direction of causality were calcu-
lated andthe empiricalresultsforthe Philippines(1956-88), Thailand (1956-
88), SouthKorea (1955-88), Malaysia (1961-88), Singapore (1967-88), and
Indonesia(1961-88).
METHODOLOGY
Hsiao (1981 ) has developed a systematic method for choosing lag
lengths to avoid the problems associated with arbitrary lag lengths. His
method combines Granger causality and Akaike's final prediction error
(FPE). Initially a series of regression equations isestimated on the depend-
3. The data used in the study appears as Appendix A, Tables A1-A6.
4. Sinoethe tests aremore robust with longerperiods, we feel more thanjustifiedin using
ACDA data on the military burden for the later years especially given the similarity to the ratio
computed (usingUN and IMFdata) for aadier years. A data sheet for each country, together with
a copy ofthe computer output, is appended tothis paper.FREDERIKSEN: GROWTH AND DEFENSE SPENDING 135
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with n takingonthe valuesfromonetosix.We thencomputethe FPEfor
eachoftheseregressionequationsas:
T+m* +n+ l
FPE(m*,n) - _ESS(m *, n)/ 7",
T-m* -n - 1
andwechoosetheoptimallaglengthforD, n*, asthe regression equation
withthelowestprediction error.
Inthesamemanner,anothersetof equationsisestimated,withDas
the dependentvariable,and laggedvaluesofD areincludedto findm*.
Then, laggedvaluesof Gareincludedtofindn*.
5. Although the ohoioeofMis arbitranh it shouldbe aslargeaspossible, consiatent with
the sample size and the underlying process. Becausoofthe relative shortness of time series data
for mostdevsioping oountdes, M was limited to sixyears.136 JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINE OEVELOPMENT
The final procedure is to test for causality, and this consists of three
steps:
STEP 1: The final prediction error for the model G = f(GL) iscompared
to the FPEfor the model G = f(GL, DL). Ifthe FPEdecreases (i.e., the model's
predic'dvepower increases as we add lagged values ofD), we conclude that
defense Granger causes growth. If, on the other hand, the FPEincreases
then we conclude that defense does not Granger cause growth.
STEP 2: The FPEfor the model D = f(DL) iscompared to the FPEfor
the model D = f(DL, GL). If the FPE declines, we conclude that growth
Granger causes defense. If the FPE increases, we conclude that growth
does not Granger cause defense.
STEP 3: We compare the FPEs under Step 1 and Step 2. If the FPE
increased in both cases, we conclude no relationship between D and G. If
the FPEdeclines inboth cases, we conclude afeedback relationship exists.
If the FPEdeclined under Step 1 but increased under Step 2, we find that
defense Granger causes growth. If the FPE increased under Step 1 but
declined under Step 2, we find that growth Granger causes defense.
EMPIRICAL RESULTS
Lag Lengths
The optimal lag lengths using I-Isiao's method on each country appear
as Table 1.eThe paired numbers inthe first column indicate the optimum lag
lengths, m* and n*, respectively, when economic growth isthe dependent
variable and lagged values of G and lagged values of the defense variable
are the independent variables. The paired numbers in the second column
indicate optimum lag lengths, m ° and n °, when defense isthe dependent
variable.
As hypothesized, the estimated optimal lag lengths differ slightly
among the countries. While we are unable at this aggregate data level to
sPecify reasonsfor individual laglength differences among the countries, it
iscomforting to see that most of the laglengths areeither one ortwo years.
These results support the findings of Looney and Frederiksen (! 990) who
looked at the determinants of defense spending inthese countries.
Past growth of GDP has an immediate impact (one year) on current
GDP in four of the countries. The one anomaly is a six-year lag rate for
Malaysia, However, this result must belooked at with caution since Hsiao's
model, while relatively consistent, tends to overestimate lag lengths. The
6. The final predlotion orrorshavo not been reported in the paper. As noted pre_Aously,
the results oan be obtained directly from the author.FREDERIKSEN: GROWTHANDDEFENSE SPENDING 137
Table I
OPTIMAL LAG LENGTHS (Years)
• It
Country G = f (GL, DL) D : f (D, , G_
Philippines (1, 1) (1, 1)
Thailand (1, 1) (1, 2)
SouthKorea (1, 5) (1, 3)
Malaysia (6, 1) (2, 3)
Singapore (2, 2) (2, 1)
Indonesia (1, 1) (1, 1)
result for Malaysia, while not spurious, isprobably lessthan the computed
six-year computed lag. In other words, earlier rates of growth of the GDP
have a more recent effect on current GDP growth than indicated by the
estimated results. In addition, the six-year lag isan average over atwenty-
eight year period and ismost likely considerably shorter ifexamined using
only recent data.
Importantly, the data indicate an almost immediate effect of the
defense burdenon growth: a one-year lag for allcountries except Singapore
which experiences a two-year lag (see Column 1) and South Korea (five-
year lag). In addition, the impact of past defense spending on current
defense spending isimmediate (one year) infour of the countries, and two
years for Thailand and Singapore. This resultalso supports earlier research
findings on the determinants of defense spending. It appears as if the
"jumping off point" for thecurrent militarybudget iseitherthe military burden
or the growth rateinGDPofthe preceding year. Past GDPgrowth rateshave
a one-year lagged impact on defense for the Philippines, Singapore and
Indonesia. Past GDP from two years ago impacts the current defense
budget in Thailand, and the impact is three years for South Korea and
Malaysia.
DEFENSE/GROWTH RELATIONSHIPS
The final step in the procedure isto compare the final prediction error
for the regressionequations to determine causality, ifany. The relationships
appear in Table 2.
Fora half ofthe sample, the data suggest a cleardirection of causality:
from economic growth to defense for Malaysia and from defense to growth
for Singapore and Indonesia. For the remaining three countries there is








Singapore Defense Granger causesGrowth
Indonesia Defense Granger causesGrowth
Korea)or a feedbackloop(Thailand).As notedabove, the aggregative
natureofthedataprohibitsusfromidentifying thespecific defenseexpendi-
turewhichcausestheeconomicgrowthoreventhetimingoftheeconomic
growthwhichinduces thefollow-ondefensespending. Thisisprimarily due
tothe examinationof dataforathirty-yearperiod.Presumably,forSinga-
poreandIndonesia,theexistenceofalargearmsindustry(especially inthe




that economicgrowthisanimportant determinantof defensespending,
whichisoppositetothe patternsuggested byBenoit.ForThailand,thefinal
predictionerrordeclinedwhen G andD were the respectivedependent
variables.Thissuggestsa"feedback" relationship wherebygrowthhasled
to moredefensewhich, inturn,hascreatedmoregrowth, andsoon. This
was the predominantcaseinthe largerstudyconductedbyLaCivitaand




to the inclusionof relativelyrecentdata (throughto 1988) in the model;
Korea'sgrowth in the last decadeor so may no longerdepend on the
defense sector (as much as it did earlier), and other factors (such as
technologicaladvances and economic diversity) have been the main
enginesofgrowth. Forthe Philippines, asinthecaseofKorea,theinclusion
ofthe defenseburdenasanindependent variable(with Gasthe dependent
variable)ortheinclusionof GasanindependentvariablewhenDwasthe
dependentvariableledto increasesinthe finalpredictionerror;defense
expenditures inthePhilippines apparentlyhavenoGrangercausalityeffectFREDERIKSEN:GROWTH AND DEFENSESPENDING 139
oneconomic growth, and growthdoesnot"cause" defense. Presumably
eitherpattern couldhave happened(orishappening)ifwe were to take
shorterperiodswithinthethirty-yearperiod.Unfortunatelythe shorterthe
timeperiodexamined,the weakeristhestatisticaltest.






specificationofthe model,andthe appropriate relationshipWillmorethan




Asiancountries.The purposewas (a)to extend an earlierpaperin this
Jouma/dealing with lag lengthsin the Philippines;(b) to update prior




"causes" economic growth-i.e., thatcorrelation implies causation. Joerding





andthe appropriatedirectionof causalityforeach country,onthe other
hand.







The resultsalsoconfirmedthat the causalrelationshipdiffersfrom
countryto country. ForSingaporeand Indonesiathe resultsindicatethat
defense Grangercausesdefense-the presumeddirectionaccordingto
Benoit.OnlyinMalaysiadideconomicgrowth appearto beadeterminant
ofdefensespending.Inthe caseofThailandourresultssuggestafeedback140 JOURNAL OFPHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
relationship; for the remaining two countries-Philippines and South
Korea-no discernible relationship between defense and growth was uncov-
ered.
The Irnpllcatlon forfurther research isthatneither defenseorgrowth
can be consideredas exogenouslydetermined. Furthermore, we do not
expectone modeltofit all countries orevenagroupofcountries Inthesame
region. The laglengths arelikely todiffer fromcountrytocountry, as does
thecausalrelationship betweenthedefenseburdenand economic growth.
Giventhecomplexity oftheinteraction ofthedefenseand growthvariables,
a fruitful areaforfuture reseamh mightbe to uncoverexactly how defense
affects growth on a count_/-by-country and year-by-year basis-atask
made difficult due tothe aggregative natureofthe reported data.Given
further breakdowns as tothetypesofmilitary spending{on,forexample,
capital equipmentorR&D), more completeinsights mightbe uncoveredas
totheroleofmilitary expenditures on theeconomy.
APPENDIX A
Table A1
DATA, REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
Gross Defense Defense USACDA Growthrate
Year Domestic expend- burden defense of realGDP
Product = iture b (pement) burden(percent) (percent)
1956 10 166 1.6 6.9
1957 11 157 1.4 5,3
1958 12 181 1.5 3.5
1959 13 181 1.4 6.7
1960 14 190 1.4 1.5
1961 15 197 1.3 5.6
1962 17 206 1.2 4.8
1963 20 209 1.0 7.0
1964 21 230 1.1 3.5
1965 23 225 1.0 5.2
1966 26 249 1.0 4.4
1967 29 290 1.0 6.1
1968 32 345 1.1 5.6
1969 35 326 0.9 4.8
1970 42 458 1.1 4.6
1971 50 543 1.1 4.9
1972 56 602 1.1 4.8
1973 72 855 1.2 9.2
1974 1O0 1941 1.9 5.0
1975 115 3982 3.5 6.4FREDERIKSEN: GROWTH ANDDEFENSE SPENDING 141
Table A1 (continued)
Gross Defense Defense USACDA Growthrate
Year Domestic expend- burden defense of realGDP
Product a iture b (percent)burden(percent) (percent)
1976 135 4118 3,1 8.0
1977 ,154 4325 2.8 6.1
1978 178 3552 2.0 2.0 5.5
1979 218 4995 2.3 2.3 6.3
1980 265 5115 1.9 1.9 5.2
1981 305 5526 1.8 1.8 3.2
1982 341 5552 1.6 1.7 3.6









Yearbook: 1984 (1956-1959), Yeadoook: 1990(1960-1980), Yea_ook:1991(1981-1988). 1956-
1983 Defense Expenditures fromUnited Nations, Statistical Yearbook, Annual Issues. Defense
Burden (1978-1988) fromUSACDA, WorldMilitaryExpenditures andArmsTransfens: 1989.
Table A2
DATA, THAILAND
Gross Defense Defense USACDA Growth rate
Year Domestic expend- burden defense ofreal GDP
Product a iture b (percent)burden(percent) (percent)
1956 43 817 1.9 6
1957 44 1567 3.6 -1.6
1958 45 1390 3.1 3.4
1959 48 1421 3.0 6.9
1960 54 1378 2.6 10.0
1961 5g 1080 1.8 5.3
1962 63 1570 2.5 8.1
1963 68 1609 2.4 8.4
1964 75 1745 2.3 6.6
1965 84 1877 2.2 7,9
1966 101 2055 2.0 12.2
1967 108 2437 2.3 7.8142 JOURNALOFPHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
Table A2 (continued)
Gross Defense Defense USACDA Growthrate
Year Domestic expend- burden defense ofreal GDP
Product, itursb (percent)burden(percent) (percent)
1968 117 2990 2.6 8,5
1969 129 3638 2.8 7,9
1970 147 4898 3.3 10,5
1971 153 5383 3.5 5.0
1972 170 5721 3.4 4.1
1973 222 5950 2.7 9.9
1974 279 7104 2.5 4.4
1975 303 7870 2.6 4.8
1976 347 9987 2.9 9.4
1977 403 12566 3.1 9.9
1978 488 17367 3.6 3.6 10.4
1979 559 22978 4.1 4.2 5.3
1980 659 27019 4.1 4.1 4.8
1981 760 29143 3.8 3.9 6.3
1982 820 33652 4.1 4.2 4.1









Yearbooks: 1984(1956-1959),Yearbook: 1990(1960-1980),Yearbook: 1991(1981-1988).
1956-1983Defense Expenditures from United Nations, StatisticelYearbook, Annual Issues.
Defense Burden 1978-1988fromUSACDA,WorldMilitaryExpenditures andArrnsTransfers,
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Table A3
DATA, SOUTH KOREA
Gross Defense Defense USACDA Growthrate
Year Domestic expend- burden defense of real GDP
Product a iturea (percent)burden(percent) (percent)
1955 113 6 5.3 4,5
1956 150 11 7.3 -1.3
1957 196 11 5.6 7.6
1958 203 13 6.4 5.5
1959 216 14 6.6 3.9
1960 243 15 6.2 1.2
1961 291 17 5.8 5.8
1962 352 21 6.0 2.1
1963 500 20 4.0 9.1
1964 711 25 3.5 9.7
1965 798 30 3.8 5,7
1966 1024 41 4.0 t2.2
1967 1259 50 4.0 5.9
1968 1630 65 4.0 11.3
1969 2130 84 3.9 13.8
1970 2724 101 3.7 8.8
1971 3379 136 4.0 9.2
1972 4170 171 4.1 5.9
1973 5416 181 3.3 14.4
1974 7569 254 3.4 7.9
1975 10224 194 1.9 6.5
1976 1_996 771 5.5 13.2
1977 18074 1008 5,6 10.9
1978 24327 1438 5.9 9.7
1979 31323 1597 5.1 7.4
1980 38041 2252 5.9 -2.0
1981 47482 2831 6.0 6.7
1982 54443 3163 5.8 7.3






J / _. l_, ,,
a.Billionsofwon
Sources: GDPendGrowthRatsof RealGDP:IMF,International FinancialStatistics
Yearbooks:1984(1955-1959), Yearbook:1990(1960-1980) Yearbook:1991(1981.1988).
Defense Expenditures fromUnitedNations, StatisticalYearbook, AnnualIssues. Defense





Gross Defense Defense defense rate of
Year Domestic expend- burden burden real GDP Price
Product a iturea (percent) (percent) (percent) Index
1961 6696 108.8 1.6 -2.1 97
1962 7056 127.4 1.8 5.4 97
1963 7515 154.9 2.1 3.3 100
1964 8056 216.5 2.7 7.2 100
1965 8837 303.1 3.4 8.6 101
1966 9394 379.5 4.0 6.3 101
1967 9774 366.6 3.8 6.1 99
1968 10160 379.3 3.7 3.9 99
196g 11629 329.6 2.8 15.6 98
1970 12155 436.7 3.6 2.4 100
1971 12955 546.0 4.2 7.1 102
1972 14220 707.6 5.0 9.4
1973 18723 725.3 3.9 11.7
1974 22858 954.7 4.2 6.3
1975 22332 1053.8 4.7 0.8
1976 28085 1117.2 4.0 11.6
1977 32340 1324.0 4.1 7.8
1978 37886 1406.0 3.7 6.7
1979 46424 1704.0 3.7 9.3
1980 53308 2253.0 4.2 7.4
1981 57613 3332.0 5.8 6.9
1982 62579 3694.0 5.9 5.9
1983 69941 3489.0 5.0 6.3
1984 79550 2626.4 3.3 7.8









in SoutheastAsia, ed. ChinKinWah (Singapore:InstituteofSoutheastAsianStudies,1987),
p.174. Defense Burden 1986-1988 from USACDA,World Military Expenditures and Arms
Transfers,1989.GrowthRateofRealGDPfor 1961-1970computedbytakingcurrentGDPand
adjustingusingConsumerPriceIndex;for 1971-1988fromInternational Financial Statistics




Year defense of real GDP
burden(percent) (percent)






















Defense Burden fromUSACDA, WorldMilitaryExpenditures andArmsTrans-
issues. Growth RateofRealGDP,1967-1980 fromIMF,International Financial


































Souroes: Defense Burden (1961-1966): Stockholm International Peace Research Insti-
tute,SIRPIYearbook1990,WorldArmaments andDisarmaments, (OxfordUniversity Press,
1990) Table5A.3.1967-1988 fromUSACDA, World MilitaryExpenditurss andArmsTransfers,
annualssues, Growth Rate ofRealGDP(1961-1980) fromIMF, IntemationalFinancialStatistics
Yearbooks: 1984;1981-1988 fromYearbook: 1991.FFIEDERIKSEN: GROWTH AND DEFENSE SPENDING 147
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